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This paper aims to increase our understanding of the genealogical method by
taking a developmental approach to Nietzsche’s genealogical methodology
and reconstructing an early instance of it: Nietzsche’s genealogy of truthfulness
in On Truth and Lie. Placing this essay against complementary remarks from
his notebooks, I show that Nietzsche’s early use of the genealogical method
concerns imagined situations before documented history, aims to reveal prac-
tical necessity before contingency, and focuses on vindication before it turns to
subversion or problematization. I argue that we understand Nietzsche’s later
critique of truthfulness better ifwe place it against the background of his earlier
vindicatory insight into the practical necessity of cultivating truthfulness in
some form; and I suggest that Nietzsche’s own mature genealogical method
has roots in its supposed contrary, the method of the “English” genealogists.
ABSTRACT
G enealogies can take many forms, especially when told in theservice of philosophy rather than history. They can string together
documented facts that are clearly indexed to particular times and places,
or present us with imagined situations that are nowhere in particular,
but that depict, in a helpfully general way, certain generic facts about
the human condition; they can be used to reveal the contingency of
our arrangements, or to reveal their practical necessity given certain
pressing needs; to subvert or at least problematize our arrangements, or
to vindicate them as apt responses to enduring problems.1
1 For examples and further discussion of these various contrasting aspects of ge-
nealogies, see Craig (2007); Hoy (2009, 225); Jenkins (2006, 164); Koopman (2009);
Millgram (2009, 163n23); Owen (2010); Paden (2003, 566), Queloz (2017, 2018, 2019,
Forthcoming-a, b, c), and Queloz and Cueni (2019). The formulations here and
throughout the paper are meant to do justice to the fact that most genealogical stories
are not intrinsically either vindicatory or subversive, and whether they are one or the
other depends notably on the normative expectations of their audience. I also take it
that the relationship between the revelation of contingency/necessity on the one
hand and subversion/vindication on the other is far from straightforward: certainly,
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While none of these contrasts are exclusive and some genealogies
may well combine all six aspects, it is clear that Nietzsche’s efforts
to distance himself from the “English genealogists” in the opening
sections of his Genealogy of Morality (GM P 7, I 2) led him to emphasise
the left-hand side of each contrast, i.e. the documentary, contingency-
revealing, and subversive aspects of genealogy—an emphasis which
was then reinforced by Foucault’s (1971) even more decidedly one-
sided rendering of Nietzsche’s genealogical method. Yet if we take
a developmental approach to Nietzsche’s genealogical method and
look for precursors of it in his earlier writings, we also find Nietzsche
deploying the genealogical method in a way that powerfully attracts
description in terms of the right-hand side of each contrast. A case in
point is his early genealogy of truthfulness, which begins to take shape
already in the early 1870s and makes up a substantial part of his 1873
essay On Truth and Lie in an Extramoral Sense.
Placing Nietzsche’sOn Truth and Lie against the background of com-
plementary remarks from his notebooks, I reconstruct this genealogy
in this paper and show that his early use of the genealogical method
concerns imagined situations before it turns to documented history,
that it aims to reveal practical necessity before contingency, and that it
focuses on vindication before it turns to subversion or problematization.
I then draw out two implications of this reconstruction: first, that we
understand Nietzsche’s later critique of truthfulness better if we place
it against the background of his earlier vindicatory insight into the
necessity of at least some form of truthfulness; and second, that an un-
derstanding of the genealogical method that aims to be adequate even
Nietzsche did not think that revealing contingent origins was in itself subversive
(GS 345; eKGWB 1884, 26[161]; 1885, 2[131]; 1885, 2[189]). I say something about this
relation in Queloz (Forthcoming-b) and Queloz and Cueni (2019). Here I focus on
the connection between practical necessity and vindication.
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to Nietzsche’s career alone should eschew a one-sided focus on either
the right- or the left-hand side characteristics of genealogy: we will
profitably draw on all six aspects already in tracing the development of
Nietzsche’s own genealogical method, for his mature method has roots
in its supposed contrary, the method of the “English” genealogists.
The paper falls into three parts. §1 motivates Nietzsche’s genealogy
of truthfulness, delineates its key steps, and highlights its resemblance
to the method of the “English” genealogists. §2 assesses the geneal-
ogy’s evaluative upshot and argues that it amounts in good part to a
vindication of truthfulness that is revelatory of practical necessity. §3
then investigates the relation of Nietzsche’s early genealogy to his later
critique of truthfulness.
1. Reconstructing Nietzsche’s Early Genealogy of Truthfulness
The aim of Nietzsche’s genealogy of values in the Genealogy is to
determine the “value of those values” (GM P 6): to discover what these
values do for creatures like us (GM P 3; BGE 4). To this end, he offers a
genealogy outlining how and why we came to live by them, and how
they relate to human psychology. This is an approach Nietzsche had
adopted before, in his 1873 essayOn Truth and Lie in an Extramoral Sense.
This essay has received much attention from post-modernists for its
discussion of the metaphorical nature of language and thought and the
doubts it voices about our ability to achieve truth as correspondence
with the world as it really is. But these Neo-Kantian doubts about our
access to the world as it is in itself will not be my concern here, except
to note that they help explain why Nietzsche is led to inquire into the
origins of truthfulness. It is precisely the realisation that the notion of
truth as correspondence with the world as it is in itself is beset with
difficulties which lends force to the question of whywe came to be so
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obsessively truthful. If we do not have access to the truth anyway, why
did we ever come to bother about being truthful?
Nietzsche rejects the Aristotelian answer to this question, which
is that truthfulness can be taken for granted as naturally given: “Man
does not by nature exist in order to know” (eKGWB 1872, 19[178]).
Although the human intellect may now be thought of as a means of
discovering truths (TL 1), Nietzsche thinks that its primary function in a
bellicose State ofNaturemust have been deception. This renders it all the
more puzzling that truthfulness should have arisen at all. “Deception,
flattering, lying, deluding, talking behind the back,” Nietzsche writes,
is “so much the rule and the law among humans that there is almost
nothing which is less comprehensible than how an honest and pure
drive to truth could have arisen among them” (TL 1). What, then, is
“the value of this will” (TL 1) to truth, and why should it have arisen?
Nietzsche’s early genealogy of truthfulness is an attempt to answer
these two questions. Sketches towards such a genealogy appear as early
as 1872, and it is developed in TL as well as in later notebook entries.
Like the GM, it “involves a projected or imaginary generic psychology,
not properly localized to times, places, or individuals” (Janaway 2007,
11). But it is unlike the GM, and more like his genealogy of justice
in HAH, whose only historical reference is to a situation in which
questions of justice precisely failed to arise (Queloz 2017), in that it
entirely fails to locate the origins of truthfulness in time and space. It
starts out from maximally generic human needs. The gist of this early
genealogy is that truthfulness has practical origins in the exigencies
of social life.2 In society, truthful utterances need to be distinguished
from untruthful, misleading, and dangerous ones. Even if all so-called
2 As Nehamas notes, TL presents the origin of truthfulness as “profoundly practi-
cal”—it “locates the origin of the drive for truth and knowledge in our need for
social organisation” (2012, 32).
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“truths” fall short of corresponding to the world as it really is—by the
standards of metaphysical truth, they are “illusions” and “lies”—the
practical demands on coexisting human beings force them to draw
some contrast between descriptions of the apparent world that are
misleading and dangerous and those that are less so. It is from this
pressure that our concern with truth stems. It has its origin not in an
epistemological contrast between truth and falsity, but in a deontological
contrast between truth and lie.3
What renders this early genealogy particularly interesting is that it
does not, in the first instance, try to subvert truthfulness by presenting
it as the contingent amalgam of incongruent historical forces, but rather
tries to make sense of its emergence in terms of its practical value and
3 Later, Nietzsche became more critical towards the claim that we do not have access
to the world as it really is (Anderson 2005; Clark 1990). This is connected to a
change in his conception of truth. His early, dismissive remarks about truth feed on
a distinction between two kinds of truth: (1) immanent truth: truth as correspondence
with the world as it appears to us under normal conditions, the world of “life, nature,
and history” (GS 344); and (2) metaphysical truth: truth as correspondence with the
True World, the world as it really is, undistorted by contingent human means of
perception, individuation and categorisation. Nietzsche seems to imagine the True
World along Schopenhauerian lines as a formless, shapeless, unindividuated chaos.
This is already apparent in BT 12, but see also TL 1 and eKGWB 1887, 9[106]. The
distinction gives Nietzsche room to maintain that so-called “truths” fall short of
corresponding to the True World—by the standards of metaphysical truth, they
are “illusions” and “lies.” In his mature work, Nietzsche abandoned the distinction
between immanent truth and metaphysical truth (see TI “True World’). He came
to see that the idea that the True World is systematically being falsified by our
constitution-laden description of it incoherently presupposes a comparison with an
unintelligible standard (Williams 2002, 17). Nietzsche’s recognition of the collapse of
the distinction between the merely apparent world and the True World is succinctly
recorded in his notebooks: “No shadow of a right remains to speak here of appearance
. . . There is no ‘other,’ no ‘true,’ no essential being—for this would be the expression
of a world without action and reaction—The antithesis of the apparent world and
the true world is reduced to the antithesis ‘world’ and ‘nothing’” (eKGWB 1888,
14[184]). But apart from the way in which his earlier understanding of truth rendered
particularly acute the question of why we value the truth, this shift in Nietzsche’s
conception of truth is independent from his genealogy of truthfulness.
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thereby goes some way towards vindicating it as an indispensable
solution to a basic problem of life in society. Many other aspects of TL
are rather less flattering,but these critical remarks sit alongside anunder-
appreciated vindicatory aspect of the text, which is strikingly thrown
into relief when placed against the background of Nietzsche’s more
cogent notebook entries on the topic. Daniel Breazeale maintains that
these notes are indispensable to understanding Nietzsche’s view of the
origin of thewill to truth,and that laterwritings suchasGS 344 or theGM
provide no reason to think thatNietzsche ever abandoned these insights
(1979, xxxiiin31). I shall vindicate the surmise that an early insight
into the practical indispensability of truthfulness endures, although
I shall also indicate discontinuities between Nietzsche’s early (TL)
and late (GS 344 and GM) thought on truthfulness. Of course, piecing
together remarks fromdifferent sources andperiods ismethodologically
hazardous, especially when it involves pieces from the Nachlass, which
has a history of being used to distortNietzsche’s published opinions. Yet
a reconstruction of Nietzsche’s early thought on truthfulness checked
against his later remarks seems worth doing nonetheless: on the one
hand, drawing out Nietzsche’s early insight into the indispensability of
truthfulness contributes to explaining why Nietzsche never abandons
truthfulness altogether, despite his critique of specific elaborations of it
(Gemes 1992, 2006); on the other hand, it offers some insight into how
Nietzsche’s method developed, which in turn sheds light on a question
that has recently attracted much interest in Anglophone philosophy, of
how genealogy itself is to be understood.
One last prefatory remark before we turn to the reconstruction
of Nietzsche’s genealogy of truthfulness. Nietzsche uses a variety of
related terms in speaking of truthfulness—“truthfulness,” “the will to
truth,” “the love of truth,” “the pathos of truth,” “honesty,” “the drive
to truth.” What unifies them is that they express human concern with the
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truth, expressed most basically in one’s making an effort to see things
as they are, undistorted by wishful thinking, and in one’s recoiling from
lying and deception.4 Disentangling the nuances between these terms
in Nietzsche’s usage would require a paper of its own, so I shall treat
them as synonymous to begin with, and introduce finer distinctions
only as required. Two distinctions are, however,worth drawing from the
start. The first is the distinction between truth-seeking and truth-telling.
Nietzsche sometimes uses these terms in connection with epistemic
activities to designate dispositions to seek the truth (eKGWB 1872,
19[175–77]), and sometimes in connection with communicative activities
to designate dispositions to tell the truth (eKGWB 1872, 19[207]).5 The
second distinction is between truthfulness as a value and the value of
truthfulness, which is a matter of the practical value of valuing the
truth. To inquire into the origin and value of truthfulness is thus to
inquire into the origin and value, for creatures like us, of a certain set
of dispositions.
With these clarifications in place, let us now turn to Nietzsche’s
account of how the dispositions of truthfulness arose. On the recon-
struction I propose, his genealogy involves six steps:
(1) Entry into Society and Language: The first step is the entry into
society and language. Nietzsche tells us that man, “from boredom and
necessity,” wishes to “exist socially and with the herd; therefore, he
needs to make peace and strives accordingly to banish from his world
at least the most flagrant bellum omni contra omnes” (TL 1). And it is in
entering society that we open the door to truthfulness:
This peace treaty brings in its wake something which appears to be
the first step toward acquiring that puzzling truth drive: that which
4 See eKGWB 1882, 3[1]; BGE 9, 230; GS P 4.
5 See Richardson (2004, 28–45) for a naturalistic reading of Nietzschean drives as
dispositions that were selected for.
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from now on shall count as “truth” is established. A uniformly valid
and binding designation is invented for things, and this legislation of
language likewise establishes the first laws of truth. For the contrast
between truth and lie arises here for the first time. The liar is a
person who uses the valid designations, the words, in order to make
something which is unreal appear to be real. (TL 1)
(2) Emergence of a Prototypical Form of Truth-seeking: The second step
is the emergence of the prototypical form of the “will not to let oneself
be deceived” (GS 344), i.e. the disposition to seek out the truth and to get
one’s beliefs right. Nietzsche argues that the emergence of the will not
to let oneself be deceived, which now forms the ground for the scientific
pursuit of truth, originally emerged out of a much narrower concern
with the consequences of deception. Truth-seeking originally arises for
instrumental reasons, as ameans of satisfying human beings’ individual
need to avoid, “not deception itself, but rather the unpleasant, adverse
consequences of certain kinds of deception;” correspondingly, it is “in
a similarly restricted sense that human beings now want nothing but
truth: they desire the pleasant, life-preserving consequences of truth;
they are indifferent to pure knowledge if it has no consequences” (TL
1). Prudence and mistrust are the individualistic motives that originally
drive humans to truthfulness as truth-seeking.
As Nietzsche’s notebooks make clear, this includes mistrust towards
oneself. An inaccurate grasp of one’s needs or fears can be as harmful
as deception by others: “In dealing with what lies outside, danger and
caution demand that one should be on one’s guard against deception: as
a psychological preconditioning for this, also in dealing with what lies
within. Mistrust as the source of truthfulness” (eKGWB 1885, 40[43]).
Considerations of utility thus drive the emergence of truthfulness
insofar as they drive the cultivation of a prudential disposition to seek
out and acquire truths.
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(3) Emergence of a Prototypical Form of Truth-telling: The third step
is the emergence of the prototype of what Nietzsche calls the “will
not to deceive” (GS 344), i.e. the disposition honestly to tell what one
takes to be the truth. Here the individualistic approach pursued so
far runs into an obstacle: individuals could not reason their way to
truthfulness as truth-telling, because truth-telling is not instrumentally
related to the reasons for action individuals can be assumed to have
anyway; from the purely instrumental point of view, truth-telling must
appear unattractive, since its value largely consists in its value to others.
Hence, the reasons one might give in answer to the question “But why
not deceive?” must lie in “a completely different area” from those one
might give when asked “But why not let oneself be deceived?” (GS 344).
Already in 1872, Nietzsche’s solution to the problem of truth-
telling’s emergence is to switch to a social point of view. Though the
individual has no reason to cultivate truth-telling, there is a collective
need to do so within society as a whole. Hence, the second stage of
truthfulness “makes its appearance as a social need” (eKGWB 1872,
19[175]); “necessity produces truthfulness as a society’s means of
existence” (eKGWB 1872, 19[177]). Truth-telling is necessary to society’s
existence because social cohesion and cooperation would break down
in the face of a general fear of being deceived. In one of the earliest notes
on the origin of truthfulness, Nietzsche writes: “One anticipates the
unpleasant consequences of reciprocal lying. From this there arises the
duty of truth” (eKGWB 1872, 19[97]). As he puts it in TL, there is “a duty
to be truthful which society imposes in order to exist” (TL 1). What one
has a duty to do, in particular, is to conform to linguistic convention in
order to represent things as one takes them to be. If someone “misuses
fixed conventions by means of arbitrary substitutions or even reversals
of names,” and “does this in a selfish and moreover harmful manner,
society will cease to trust him and will thereby exclude him” (TL 1). In
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a later note, he spells out the imperative which society addresses to the
individual thus:
You shall be knowable, express your inner nature by clear and constant
signs—otherwise you are dangerous: and if you are evil, your ability to
dissimulate is the worst thing for the herd. We despise the secret and
unrecognisable.—Consequently youmust consider yourself knowable,
you may not be concealed from yourself, you may not believe that
you change. (eKGWB 1883, 24[19])
This last sentence opens up a vista on two further, and connected,
thoughts. One is that “‘I do not want to deceive myself’ is included
as a special case under the generalisation ‘I do not want to deceive’”
(GS 344), because a self-deceived informant is as unhelpful as a lying
one. The other is that “the demand for truthfulness presupposes the
knowability and stability of the person” (eKGWB 1883, 24[19]). How
so? Nietzsche’s answer seems to be that truth-telling can only have
practical value insofar as finding out what individuals really believe
or desire possesses predictive value, and this is only the case if these
beliefs and desires display a certain degree of stability. Part of the
reason why others want to know what I believe and desire is that
they want to rely on that information in predicting how I will behave,
and they can only do that insofar as my beliefs and desires exhibit
some stability. This is an application of the point that rendering the
individual fit for coexistence in society involves “making” the individual
“to a certain degree necessary, uniform, like among like, regular, and
accordingly predictable” (GM II 2). Moreover, the sincere expression
of one’s beliefs and desires must exhibit a minimal amount of stability
over time if it is to count as a sincere expression at all (this is the sense
in which truthfulness indeed presupposes the stability of the person).
The cultivation of truthfulness as truth-telling requires the cultivation,
to a certain degree—Nietzsche is clear that full-blown essentialism is not
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called for—of a belief in the relative constancy of human beings: “it is
the object of education to create in the herd member a certain degree
of belief in the essence of man: it is only at this point that this belief is
generated, so that “truthfulness” can then be demanded” (eKGWB 1883,
24[19]).
Since Nietzsche holds that it is with the help of the Sittlichkeit der
Sitte that “man was made truly calculable,” this suggests that truth-
telling already formed part of the Sittlichkeit der Sitte, and thus of the
“true work of man on himself for the longest part of the duration of
the human race, his entire prehistoric work” (GM II 2). Truthfulness,
Nietzsche writes in his notebooks, is “the foundation of all contracts”
(eKGWB 1873, 29[8]), including, as we are now in a position to see, the
social contract. Failure to comply with the socially imposed obligation
to be truthful leads to social exclusion. It is therefore by way of society’s
interest in truthfulness as truth-telling that it also comes to be in the
individual’s interest to be truthful in this sense: since life in society is
preferable to life in a Hobbesian State of Nature, fear of exclusion gives
the individual reason to forfeit opportunities to deceive for personal
gain. Ultimately, however, it is social considerations of utility that drive
the emergence of truthfulness insofar as they drive the cultivation of
the disposition to preserve and transmit truths.6
It is thus functional demands, first at the level of the individual, and
then at the level of society, that explain the emergence of truthfulness as
truth-seeking and as truth-telling, respectively. In each case, themotives
appealed to are prudential, which imposes limits on what forms of
truthfulness this account is capable of explaining—limits as to whom
one is to be truthful towards and how much information one is to convey.
It is thus not obvious that one should be truthful towards people outside
6 Pettit (2018, ch. 2) offers a notably similar story about how truth-telling emerges out
of the fear of ostracism.
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one’s community: “Within a herd, within any community, that is to
say inter pares, the overestimation of truthfulness makes good sense,”
namely as a “mutual obligation between equals!” (eKGWB 1885, 40[43]).
He spells this out later: “One says what one thinks, one is ‘truthful,’
only under certain conditions: namely, that one is understood (inter
pares), and understood charitably (once again inter pares). One conceals
oneself in presence of the unfamiliar” (eKGWB 1886, 7[6]). The social
imperative to be truthful is thus restricted to encounters with one’s
equals, where equality implies not only sameness of strength, but also
of group membership (as Don Corleone puts it in the Godfather, never
let anyone outside the family know what you are thinking). Even then,
there is still a question about how far one must disclose one’s thoughts
to satisfy the requirements of truthfulness. Cleary, Nietzsche did not
think that truthfulness implied complete disclosure: “the demand that
one should denude oneself with every word one says is a piece of naiveté”
(eKGWB 1886, 7[6]).
Originally, then, it stands with truthfulness much as it stands with
deceit: it has limited application, and what value it has is the practical
value it derives from its consequences. Truthfulness is useful from the
point of view of the individual as a means of controlling the world,
of avoiding deception, of communicating effectively, and of avoiding
exclusion from society; and it is useful from the point of view of society
as ameans of securing social cohesion, cooperation and stability. In each
case, a calculus of utility explains, sustains and justifies truthfulness.
(4) Forgetting about the Original Function of Truthfulness: The fourth
step in Nietzsche’s genealogy is that truthfulness’ original function is
forgotten. Forgetfulness about functional origins is a tendency which
Nietzsche also invokes in his account of the origins of justice at HAH I
13 • Matthieu Queloz
92, and he seems to regard it as a general human tendency.7 People are
truthful “in accordance with centuries-old habits” (TL 1) and forgetwhy
truthfulness as truth-seeking and truth-telling was originally cultivated.
(5) Moralisation of Truthfulness: The fifth step is the development
of truthfulness from an instrumental into an independently motivating
reason for action. Our attitude towards truth is not conditional on
its possessing instrumental value for us. We are sometimes truthful,
not because doing so has beneficial consequences, but just because that
is the kind of action it is. In these cases we are, as Nietzsche puts it,
unconditionally truthful. How did such an unconditional drive to truth
emerge? This is a question which Nietzsche poignantly raises in Book
Five of the GS:
Where might science get the unconditional belief or conviction on
which it rests, that truth is more important than anything else, than
every other conviction? Precisely this conviction could never have
originated if truth and untruth had constantly made it clear that they
were both useful, as they are. So, the faith in science, which after all
undeniably exists, cannot owe its origin to such a calculus of utility;
rather, it must have originated in spite of the fact that the disutility
and dangerousness of the “will to truth” or “truth at any price” is
proved to it constantly. (GS 344)
When Nietzsche stresses the disutility of unconditional truthfulness,
one might think he overdoes it a little. After all, truthfulness that is
unconstrained by considerations of utility (and thus unconditioned
in the sense of not being directly subservient to further aims) might
nevertheless have its uses. It is, for instance, one argument for pure
as opposed to applied research that the scientific enterprise proves
more useful in the long run if it is not guided by potentials for useful
application. Might such long-term calculations of utility not account
for the emergence of unconditional truthfulness? Nietzsche’s answer,
7 See Queloz (2017).
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it seems to me, must be that it might indeed account for truthfulness
that is unconditional in this weak sense, but that the attitude which
takes truth to be “more important than anything else” and strives for
truth “at any price” (GS 344) is unconditional in a further and stronger
sense: it considers truth to be not merely an end in itself, but an end to
be realised under any conditions. We can thus distinguish three forms of
truthfulness:
(i) Conditional truthfulness: truth is valued only instrumentally, as a
means to an end.
(ii) Unconditional truthfulness as a pro tanto reason: truth is valued in
itself as providing a pro tanto reason for action.
(iii) Unconditional truthfulness as an overriding reason: truth is valued
in itself as providing an overriding reason for action—a reason
which, even all things considered, trumps every other reason.
Unconditional truthfulness as an overriding reason is what Nietzsche
gives voice to when he writes: “Nothing is more necessary than truth;
and in relation to it, everything else has only secondary value” (GS 344).
Such an attitude, he thinks, cannot be vindicated by considerations
of utility, because “there is no pre-established harmony between the
furthering of truth and the well-being of humanity” (HAH I 517).
Nietzsche quotes a line of Byron’s on this point: “The tree of knowledge
is not that of life” (HAH I 109). There comes a point where the will to
truth comes into conflictwith life, namely when it can be expressed only
at the cost of the expression and realisation of our other values, our
other drives and instincts.8 This holds for both the truth-seeking and
8 Here, with the conflict between truthfulness and life, we catch a glimpse of where
Nietzsche’s genealogy of truth connects to his doctrine of thewill to power—the cluster
of ideas which notably involves the claims that “life itself is will to power” (BGE 13),
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the truth-telling aspect of truthfulness. Truth-seeking involves what
Williams calls an “investigative investment” (2002, 87)—we sacrifice
not only time and energy for it, but also other things that we value, if
only because we forfeit the opportunity to pursue those things instead.
And because truth-seeking comes at a cost, there is always a question
of how far the pursuit of the truth about a given matter should be
pushed; of when the price of further inquiry and greater certainty is
too high. Sacrificing everything else to the quest for truth results in the
self-abnegating figure of the scholar that Nietzsche criticises in the
GM’s Third Treatise. Similarly, sacrificing everything else to the demand
for truth-telling issues in the equally unattractive figure who would
tell the truth even to the murderer at the door (an unconditional form
of truth-telling notoriously advocated by Kant, though the example
is Augustine’s).9 How, then, could such unconditional and overriding
forms of truthfulness have arisen?
In TL, Nietzsche suggests that it is because the prudential motives to
truthfulness have moved out of sight with the forgetting of truthfulness’
original function that the socially imposed duty to be truthful can
generate what Nietzsche calls moralmotives:
and that “the great and small struggle revolves everywhere around preponderance,
around growth and expansion, around power and in accordance with the will to
power, which is simply the will of life” (GS 349). An adherent of this doctrine might
see the will to power at work in Nietzsche’s account of the emergence of truthfulness,
which is presented as standing originally in the service of life or power; similarly,
the ensuing account of how truthfulness comes to be pursued at the expense of life
might be seen as explaining—and perhaps also as condemning—the respects in
which the will to truth came to turn against the will to power out of which it first
grew. The connection between the will to truth and the will to power is spelled out in
different ways by, e.g., Jenkins (2012, 2016); Reginster (2006, 2013, 2018); Richardson
(1996, 2004).
9 For a Nietzschean critique of Kant’s “fetishization of assertion” and of his com-
mitment to the idea that everyone equally deserves the truth, see Williams (2002,
100–22).
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. . . precisely because of this unconsciousness, precisely because of
this forgetting, one arrives at the feeling of truth. From the feeling
that one is obliged to designate one thing as “red,” another as “cold,”
and a third as “mute,” there arises a moral impulse in regard to truth;
from its opposite, the liar whom no one trusts and all exclude, human
beings demonstrate to themselves just how honourable . . . truth is.
(TL 1)
The habit of truthfulness, heretofore understood only as a prudentially
motivated disposition, is given a moral gloss and becomes a virtue:
“our habits become virtues,” Nietzsche suggests, because we “include
inviolability within the concept” of the behavioural patterns we are in
the habit of engaging in—“because we consider their inviolability to be
more important than our ownparticularwelfare” (eKGWB 1872, 19[185]).
This is the “recoining of habit as virtue, of Sitte as Sittlichkeit,” which
Nietzsche dubs a “fine old—age-old—piece of counterfeiting” (eKGWB
1882, 3[1]). TheHegelian phrase Sittlichkeit der Sitte, an enduring element
in Nietzsche’s later thought, points to the normative force of habits and
the weight of precedent, which comes into play whenever the fact that
particular patterns of behaviour have been unbroken in the past itself
becomes a reason not to break them: “Sitte represents the experiences of
men of earlier times as to what they supposed useful and harmful—but
the feeling for the Sitte (Sittlichkeit) applies, not to these experiences as
such, but to the age, the sanctity, the indiscussability of the Sitte. And
so this feeling hinders the acquisition of new experiences and the
correction of Sitten” (D 19).10 Useful dispositions arise because they are
useful; but they are held in place by ties which are less conditional than
those of prudence: those of moral feeling. It is when habits become
anchored in feelings of inviolability that with truthfulness, we “stand
on moral ground” (GS 344).
10 These passages illustrate how misleading the translation of Sitte and Sittlichkeit as
“custom” and “morality” can be.
17 • Matthieu Queloz
(6) Metaphorical Extension of Truthfulness’ Domain of Application:
The sixth and final step in Nietzsche’s genealogy is the metaphorical
extension of truthfulness’ domain of application. It is the coupling of
the moral notion of truthfulness with what Nietzsche considers to be a
“fundamental human drive”—the “drive to form metaphors” (TL 2). It
is this synthesis which produces the unconditional and disinterested
drive to truth or knowledge:
Under certain circumstances, necessity produces truthfulness as a
society’s means of existence. Through frequent practice, this drive is
reinforcedand is now,bymeans ofmetastasis,unjustifiably transferred.
It becomes an inclination in itself. A quality [i.e. truthfulness] develops
out of a practice [developed] for specific cases.—Now we have the
drive to knowledge. This generalisation takes place by means of the
intervening concept. This quality begins with a false judgment:—to be
true [i.e. truthful] means to be true [i.e. truthful] always. From this
arises the inclination to live without lies: elimination of all illusions. . . .
Two qualities, each required for a different purpose, have produced the
inclination to truth—truthfulness—and metaphor. Thus the intellectual
drive is produced by an aesthetically generalised moral phenomenon.
(eKGWB 1872, 19[177–8])
Having been brought into existence by individual fear of deception,
augmented by a social imperative not to deceive others, and transformed
by forgetfulness and the force of habit into amoral notion, the concept of
truthfulness acquires a significance that is independent of individual or
social exigencies. This in turn leads to its being applied to circumstances
beyond those that drove its emergence. Havingmade its “appearance as
a social need,” “bymeans of ametastasis, it is then applied to everything,
where it is not required” (eKGWB 1872, 19[175]). Nietzsche’s talk of
“metastasis” and “metaphor” indicates that a transfer has taken place
from the sphere of application in which truthfulness originally had its
home and was instrumentally justified to spheres of application where
it is no longer instrumentally justified (hence the transfer’s description
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as “unjustifiable”). It is an aesthetic generalisation because “between
two absolutely different spheres . . . there is no causality, no correctness,
no expression, but at most an aesthetic way of relating” (TL 1)—that
is, the generalisation is not rationally intelligible, but is driven only by
associative or analogical thinking.
Among the contingent extensions of truthfulness, Nietzsche argues,
was the transfer of truthfulness from the social to the natural sphere.
It came to be expected not only that other people would be truthful
towards oneself,but that naturewould follow suit: onewouldbe granted
access not only to the real opinions of other people, but also to the world
as it really is—when “man sets up truthfulness as a law for himself,
he also believes in the truthfulness of nature towards him” (eKGWB
1872, 19[207]). He “transfers his inclination to truth to the world and
believes that the world must in turn be true towards him” (eKGWB 1872,
19[177]).
With this reconstruction of Nietzsche’s genealogy of truthfulness
in place, we are in a position to draw out the first main observation
about Nietzsche’s methodology that I want to make in this paper: that
it strikingly resembles just the kind of “English”-style genealogy that
Nietzsche distances himself from in the GM. “English” genealogies, he
remarks there, start out from a hypothesis about the original function
of a certain way of valuing, and then suggest that while the valuation
solidifies through habit, its function is forgotten, so that it is unjustifi-
ably extended beyond the boundaries of its original functionality (GM
I 2). Following just this pattern, Nietzsche’s genealogy of truthfulness
starts out from a hypothesis about the original function of the value
of truthfulness, and then suggests that while this valuation solidifies
through habit, its function is forgotten, so that it is erroneously extended
beyond its original domain of application. As both the value and the
scope of truthfulness are inflated to the point where it is demanded
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always and “at any price” (eKGWB 1872, 19[97]; GS P 344), it becomes a
“hypertrophic virtue” (eKGWB 1873, 30[2]). The puzzling truth drive
is thus “an extension or a solidification of a way of thinking and act-
ing which was necessary in certain cases” (eKGWB 1872, 19[178]). This
licenses the conclusion that at least one of Nietzsche’s own early genealo-
gies was in the “English” style, explaining the emergence of practices
in terms of their original functionality and invoking forgetfulness as
the mechanism by which they could subsequently outgrow a merely
functional understanding and develop a life of their own. What is less
clear is how Nietzsche’s genealogy of truthfulness is supposed to bear
on the value of truthfulness, so it is to this question that I now turn.
2. The Evaluative Upshot of Nietzsche’s Genealogy
Contrary to his reputation as an arch debunker, Nietzsche’s genealogy
displays what at first seems puzzlingly unrelated to human needs as
being in fact so related. The generic situation and agents he starts out
from are, I contend, best understood as a kind of idealisation or model
that serves to uncover the basic point of truthfulness by deriving the
need for a prototype of it from more basic needs.11 This gives us a
critical grip on truthfulness. It allows us to assess whether we approve
of its point in the light of our other commitments, while also driving
home the thought that some form of truthfulness is required given a
commitment to social existence. The model helps us determine which
demands are necessary to truthfulness in any form, and which might
be reined in without it losing its point—notably with respect to how
much inquiry and disclosure it requires and towards whom.
11 For further discussion of the interpretation of certain genealogies as a kind of
idealisation or model, see Kusch (2009, 2011, 2013), Kusch and McKenna (2018), and
Queloz (2017, 2018, 2019, Forthcoming-a, b, d).
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In relating the virtue of truthfulness to needs, Nietzsche’s treatment
of truthfulness is representative of his treatment of virtues more widely:
“All virtues arise from pressing needs” (eKGWB 1872, 19[175]). Fifteen
years later,he still conceives ofvirtues in functional terms as contributing
to the effective operation of society: “I attempt an economic justification
of virtue.—The task is to make man as useful as possible and to
approximate him, as far as possible, to an infallible machine: to this end
he must be equipped with the virtues of the machine;” and precisely
because the states in which he is useful are not those he would be
drawn to out of self-interest, “he must learn to experience the states in
which he works in a mechanically useful way as the supremely valuable
states”—they must be “enveloped in a higher charm” (eKGWB 1887,
10[11]).12
What is particularly interesting about this passage is that it forms a
functional derivation of non-functionalistways of thinking. It shows how
function leads to the veiling of function. Nietzsche explains virtues as
emerging out of needs in virtue of the beneficial effects they have when
they become habits, and as being best sustained when understood in
moral rather than instrumental terms. He does not take this to subvert
their status as virtues, but to provide an “economic justification” of
virtues: an evaluation in terms of their uses and disadvantages for life
which finds them beneficial overall and uses this fact to support an
explanation of their emergence.13
To this extent, Nietzsche’s genealogy constitutes what Bernard
Williams (2002, 36) calls a vindicatory explanation of truthfulness. The
genealogy is vindicatory in three respects. First, it offers a negative
vindication of truthfulness: it does not excavate anything to suggest
12 See TI “Skirmishes” 29.
13 I say more about Nietzsche’s notion of an “economic justification” in Queloz
(Forthcoming-c).
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our endorsement of truthfulness to be radically self-deceived, thus
clearing truthfulness of suspicion and marking it out as stable under
reflection. Second, it offers a naturalistic vindication of truthfulness: it
enables us to make sense of truthfulness in terms of the rest of nature,
in particular in terms of basic needs of cooperation and communication
which humans can be assumed to have anyway. Third, the genealogy
offers a pragmatic vindication of truthfulness by revealing the point of
truthfulness, which it is shown to possess relative to needs so basic that
they obtain in anything recognisable as a human society. This does not,
by itself, provide a reason for the individual to be truthful on a given
occasion. But it provides a collective reason to cultivate truthfulness in
society. It shows that truthfulness is in the common interest.
There is a cut-off point, however; although the genealogy shows
to what extent truthfulness responds to practical exigencies, it also
indicates in what respects it involves contingent, unjustified aspects.
To the extent that the functional requirements to which truthfulness
supposedly answers are general enough to suggest that they obtain
even today, Nietzsche’s genealogy presents truthfulness as something
we cannot do without. Truthfulness is shown to be firmly rooted in
basic human needs, and is thus “economically” justified as life-serving.
To the extent, however, that truthfulness exhibits elements which are not
supported by the functional part of the narrative, but only accounted
for in principle by the part of the genealogy which acts as a placeholder
for complex, contingent historical developments, it is merely allowed
for, but not vindicated. With such hypertrophic truthfulness, the risk
is that it will be pursued at the cost of other things; indeed, on the
assumption that there is no pre-established harmony between the
furthering of truth and the furthering of well-being, they are bound to
come into conflict. Then hypertrophic truthfulness will be life-denying,
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as Nietzsche suggests when he ascribes to it the motto “fiat veritas pereat
vita” (UM II 4), let truth prevail though life perish.14
It is worth noting that there is an enduring plausibility to much
of Nietzsche’s genealogical story about truthfulness. Writing over a
hundred years later, Bernard Williams (2002) told much the same story
in his book-length genealogy of truthfulness. Both Nietzsche (eKGWB
1885, 40[43]) and Williams (2002, 125) take it to follow from their
genealogies that truthfulness must include resistance against deception
from “within.” They also both conclude that truthfulness presupposes
a belief in what Nietzsche calls the “stability of the person” (eKGWB
1883, 24[19]) and Williams the process of “steadying the mind” (2002,
191): we must cultivate moderately steady outlooks or beliefs, Williams
argues, because “there are others who need to rely on our dispositions,
and we want them to be able to rely on our dispositions because we, up
to a point, want to rely on theirs” (2002, 192). They also both deem a
“blind rage for collecting, a restless raking together of everything that
has ever existed” (UM II 3) and “terminally mindless fact-acquisition”
(2002, 256) to be a regrettable outgrowth of truth-seeking; Nietzsche
warns against the overeager pursuit of scientific progress, maintaining
that this would destroy science, “just as a hen perishes if it is compelled
to lay eggs too quickly” (UM II 7), while Williams makes comparable
points about pushing inquisitiveness and suspicion too far (2002, 2–3,
15, 212, 301n44). On the side of truth-telling, they both deny (contra
Kant) that everyone equally deserves being told the truth (eKGWB
1885, 40[43]; 2002, 122), or (contra Rousseau) that complete disclosure is
required (eKGWB 1886, 7[6]; 2002, 85, 109, ch. 8).
Nietzsche’s early genealogy thus identifies the functionally vindicated
prototype of truthfulness, which includes independently motivating yet
14 See eKGWB 1873, 29[8] and GM III 7.
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not overriding norms of truth-seeking and truth-telling, but marks
out all developments beyond that as prima facie contingent insofar as
they lack a practical rationale. Some of these problematic historical
manifestations of the prototype of truthfulness are addressed in later
works, particularly in theGM, so it is to this later critique of truthfulness
that we now turn.
3. Nietzsche’s Later Critique of Truthfulness
In the GM, Nietzsche writes that if a moralised distinction between
truthfulness and lying is available in a socially unequal society, it will
be harnessed by the upper caste to articulate their superiority. They
will describe themselves as “the truthful ones,” as “distinct from the
lying common man” (GM I 5).15 Nietzsche also alludes to the historical
processes by which truthfulness became tied up with the ascetic ideal,
andultimately came to undermine it fromwithin. But the central feature
of the GM for our concerns is its critique of hypertrophic truthfulness.
Nietzsche takes scholars to task for exercising a form of self-restraint
and self-effacement in their striving for objectivity which rivals the
priests’ asceticism and life-denial.16
This can be read as a condemnation of a specific form of truthfulness
rather than awholesale rejection of it. Drawing on our earlier distinction
between (i) conditional truthfulness, (ii) unconditional truthfulness as
a pro tanto reason, and (iii) unconditional truthfulness as an overriding
reason, we can reconcile Nietzsche’s vindication with his critique.
His early genealogy offers practical reasons why the disposition to
truthfulness should be cultivated within a society in some form and
circumstances, namely those where it has a point, which vindicates (i).
15 Shapin (1994) lends historical support to this idea.
16 See Gemes (1992, 2006). Daston andGalison (1992, 83, 121–22) describe the asceticism
involved in nineteenth-century science.
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He also indicates practical reasons for regarding truthfulness as more
than a means to an end, thereby vindicating (ii). What his genealogy
does not yield are reasons for regarding truthfulness as an unconditional
and overriding reason for action that licenses the attitude of fiat veritas,
pereat vita, and it is this attitude, i.e. (iii), which Nietzsche warns against
as potentially life-endangering in UM and GM.
There are of course also notable discontinuities between Nietzsche’s
early and late accounts of truthfulness: TL, on the one hand, and GS
344 and GM, on the other hand, propose different models to explain
how the commitment to truthfulness became unconditional. In TL, the
emergence of truthfulness as an overriding reason is explainedbyappeal
to the metaphorical drive and our forgetfulness about the nature of
truth. This explanation in terms of natural propensities to metaphorical
transfer and forgetfulness about function is abandoned in theGM,where
Nietzsche derides this explanatory appeal to forgetfulness as involving
a “psychological absurdity” (GM I 2–3). Nonetheless, the GM still seeks
to account for the emergence of a hypertrophic form of truthfulness. It
simply replaces the explanation in terms of natural propensities with
an explanation in terms of historical contingencies: the ascetic ideal as
expressed in Christianity is made to take the place of forgetfulness in
the earlier explanation, and the respects in which truthfulness is infused
with asceticism become the new basis forNietzsche’s reservations about
truthfulness.
Yet none of these discontinuities threatenNietzsche’s earlier insights
into the positive aspects of truthfulness: the respects in which it answers
to genuine needs. Hence, while there are several aspects of his earlier
genealogy which the Nietzsche of GM would have been critical of—its
disregard for history, its reliance on an implausible mechanism of
forgetfulness, and its neglect of the role of the ascetic ideal—there is
little reason to think he abandoned his earlier insights into the need of
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any society to cultivate at least some form of truthfulness if it is not to
dissolve into chaos.
Ifwe take this insight into theneed for truthfulness to survive into the
period in which Nietzsche writes GM, it helps explain why truthfulness
emerges unscathed from the otherwise so thorough revaluation of
values that Nietzsche describes as ushering in Slave morality. The
“fear-inspiring consistency” with which the “aristocratic value equation
(good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = beloved of God)” was
inverted to suggest that the good and blessed in God are the “miserable,”
“poor,” “powerless,” “suffering,” and “ugly” (GM I 7) did not go so
far as to invert the rank order between truthfulness and lying. Why is
truthfulness exempt from this revaluation?
Nietzsche does not account for this exemption, but our reconstruc-
tion of his earlier thoughts on the matter suggests that truthfulness is
held in place by practical exigencies. Which particular form truthfulness
takes is a matter of contingent historical development, but Nietzsche’s
genealogy has shown that some form of truthfulness is necessary to
the satisfaction of both individual needs (such as the need to avoid the
unpleasant consequences of being deceived) and social needs (such
as the need to avoid breakdowns of social cohesion and cooperation).
What he has delineated as the prototype of truthfulness is part of the
minimal ethical consciousness that renders social coexistence possible
in the first place.
This also helps explain why some form of truthfulness survives
a second revaluation of values, namely that envisaged by Nietzsche
himself. Nietzsche praises, and remains committed to, a stringent sort of
truthfulness—though not as stringent and certainly not as unquestion-
ing as the attitude of fiat veritas, pereat vita.17 Nietzsche’s early thought
17 See Harper (2015); Jenkins (2016); Owen (2003, 2007); Reginster (2013).
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tells us little about why he later valued truthfulness to the extent that he
did—truthfulness, he later notes, requires “greatness of soul” (AC 50),
and how much truth a spirit can endure is “the real measure of value”
(EH P 3). But it does tell us something about why the later Nietzsche
continued to hold on to truthfulness in some form—why he did not give
up on truthfulness. David Owen (2007) has offered one explanation
along these lines, suggesting that Nietzsche was implicitly concerned
with reflective stability: “unless truthfulness is an intrinsic value for
Nietzsche, his project of re-evaluation will not possess the right kind of
reflective stability” (2007, 70). It may be true that Nietzsche would be
pecking into dust the tree that supports his genealogical inquiry if he
were to renounce truthfulness altogether. Yet in the light of the above,
we can add a second rationale for Nietzsche’s enduring commitment
to some form of truthfulness: that he was well aware that the need
for truthfulness forms a corollary of the demand for social as much
as for reflective stability. His earlier derivation of non-hypertrophic
truthfulness from basic individual and social needs had made it clear
to him that truthfulness was something we could not do without.
Conclusion
This reconstruction of an early precursor of Nietzsche’s genealogical
method has revealed not only a rather different Nietzsche, who has
more in commonwith his supposed “English” counterparts than he lets
on, but also a rather different employment of his genealogical method,
which shows it to be more of a multi-purpose tool than might perhaps
be expected: Nietzsche himself also uses genealogical stories starting
from imaginary situations to vindicate and highlight the practical
necessity of some of our arrangements. One lesson this holds is that
an understanding of the genealogical method that aims to be adequate
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even to Nietzsche’s oeuvre alone should eschew a one-sided focus either
on the documentary, contingency-revealing, and subversive aspects
or on the imaginary, necessity-revealing, and vindicatory aspects of
genealogy. By thinking of genealogy in terms encompassing all of these
characteristics, we bring into view comparably neglected genealogies
such as Nietzsche’s early genealogy of truthfulness, and we become
better able to see its continuities and discontinuities with his later
genealogy.
Another lesson, reflected in Nietzsche’s own development of the
genealogical method in the course of his career, is that reflection on
generic needs can take us only so far: it can take us from general facts
about the human situation to anthropologically necessary responses
to them. But if genealogy is to render a phenomenon intelligible in its
actual form, the identification of a functional prototype through the
representation of general requirements will likely have to lead into an
account of its further development in response to historically local needs.
Nietzsche acknowledges that reflection alone cannot account for the
hypertrophic form of truthfulness, for example. If only schematically, a
developmental model of truthfulness needs to heed historically situated
developments such as the slave revolt (GM I) and the rise of the ascetic
ideal (GM III).18
It is in this context that we should see Nietzsche’s emphasis on
the need to heed the grey documents of history at the beginning of
the Genealogy (P 7) and his subsequent insouciance towards historical
detail. Nietzsche knew well how far he was from writing history in the
18 That same lesson is also drawn by Williams, who acknowledges that the generic
needs favouring the emergence of the concept of truthfulness cannot account for
the extension of truthfulness to the distant past (2002, ch. 7), or for its fashioning
into the ideal of personal authenticity (ch. 8). Hence Williams’s conclusion that
“philosophy, in order to do its business, must move into history” (2002, 173). See
Queloz (Forthcoming-a) for further discussion of this argument.
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sense of Wolf, Niebuhr, Ranke, or Mommsen, whose methodology he
approved of (Brobjer 2007). His genealogy combines the blue and the
grey, the imagined and the documented.
It is perhaps more easily accepted that a genealogy combines the
vindicatory and the subversive than that it combines the imagined
and the documented. But drawing on imagined situations need not
make a genealogy purely hypothetical in the way that the justificatory
state-of-nature stories about the state in political philosophy perhaps
are. Instead of classifying genealogies according towhether they involve
imaginedordocumented elements,we can distinguish genealogies from
each other and from other historical approaches in terms of the questions
to which they form the answer. In Nietzsche’s case, the question is:
what is the value of a given way of valuing? It is unsurprising that a
genealogy seeking to answer this questionwill be tailored to demands of
salience,perspicuity,andpersuasiveness that are quite different from the
demands on answers to more Hobbesian or Foucauldian questions. The
demands raised by the Nietzschean question might be met by offering
a model constructed out of a range of resources—not only ascertained
facts, but also conjectural hypotheses about how the genealogised item
relates to human needs and psychology, and these relations are perhaps
best represented using simplifications and distortions. Nietzsche’s
genealogy of truthfulness is imaginary in this sense: it abstracts from
the particulars of given cultural situations in order to highlight generic
dynamics explaining why something might have emerged and earned
its keep. A genealogy along these lines can still be truthful to what
happened even if it resorts to idealised situations, stripped of the
specifics of any actual socio-historical situation, in order better to serve
its purpose. In combining the documented and the imagined in this
way, genealogy is no different from art, whose creative liberties can
render it more truthful, or science, whose idealising and distorting
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assumptions can have the same effect. Like art and science, genealogy
reminds us that there is such a thing as truthful imagination.19
19 I am indebted to the editors of theArchiv für Geschichte der Philosophie as well as to two
anonymous reviewers for their constructive suggestions. Another debt is to Markus
Wild, Rebekka Hufendiek, Damian Cueni, Julia Wagner, Johannes Steizinger, Martin
Kusch, Jelscha Schmid, Muriel Leuenberger, and the audience at the International
Conference on European Pragmatism: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives at the
University of Vienna for helpful discussions. Finally, I would like to thank Katia
Saporiti for her encouraging response to a very early version of this paper and, more
generally, for kindling my interest in Nietzsche. This work was supported by the
Swiss National Science Foundation [P0BSP1_162025].
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